Full Report

The numbers behind PT Metrodata Electronics Tbk: as-reported financial statements and company metrics for FY2022–FY2025, traced to the source filings, opened with the share-price history those statements have to justify. Every linked figure opens the exact page of the filing it was printed on, with the statement row highlighted. Amounts in Rp millions unless noted.

Reading notes: All figures are consolidated and stated in millions of Rupiah, exactly as printed in the filings' financial statements ("Expressed in millions of Rupiah"). The provider numeric feed for this run contained ONLY a balance sheet (data/financials/balance_sheet.json); income statement, cash flow, and segment revenue are 100% sourced from the audited filings. The feed's balance-sheet figures reconcile exactly to the filings for every overlapping year (FY2020–FY2025), so no discrepancies are logged. FY2022–FY2025 are all filing-cited. Each year is cited to its own annual report where available (FY2025→FY2025 AR, FY2024→FY2024 AR, FY2023→FY2023 AR); FY2022 is the comparative column of the FY2023 annual report (no FY2022 annual report is in the corpus). FY2016–FY2021 shareholders' equity in the Long-Term Record is from the standardized data feed (stockanalysis.com, reconciled to filed statements) and is shown without page links; no pre-FY2022 income statement or cash-flow data was available in the corpus or feed.

Share Price — Available History Since January 2026

The stock closed at IDR 510.00 on Jul 27, 2026 — down 12% over the window shown, trading between IDR 488.00 and IDR 605.00. At that close the stock trades at 7.7× FY2025 diluted EPS as reported below.

Source: market price feed, daily closes, Jan 2026–Jul 2026 — the feed marks this available history as partial. Price return only, excludes dividends.

FY2025 at a Glance

Source: FY2025 consolidated statements [1] [2] [3]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Revenue by Segment (External Sales)

Revenue by Segment (External Sales)	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Distribution	15,958,796	15,877,843	18,961,147	20,713,495
Solution and consultation	5,029,501	6,208,547	6,187,791	6,464,264
Total net revenue	20,988,297	22,086,390	25,148,938	27,177,759
Total net revenue growth, derived	—	+5.2%	+13.9%	+8.1%

Source: Note 25 Segment Information — external sales by operating division (Distribution; Solution and consultation) [4] [5] [6] [7]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Gross Profit by Segment

Gross Profit by Segment	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Distribution	1,011,553	1,057,980	1,227,367	1,276,767
Solution and consultation	729,247	859,446	928,612	949,961
Total segment gross profit	1,740,800	1,917,426	2,155,979	2,226,728

Source: Note 25 Segment Information — gross profit by operating division (before consolidation elimination) [4] [5] [6] [7]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Income Statement

Source: Consolidated Statements of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income [1] [2] [3]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Columns marked E are consensus analyst estimates from S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ), shown alongside reported results for direct comparison; they are not company guidance.

Estimate source: S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ) consensus, as of 2026-07-27. Estimate figures are S&P Capital IQ consensus (vendor data — no filing page links). EPS and net income use the normalized (adjusted) consensus where the street reports it.

Balance Sheet

Source: Consolidated Statements of Financial Position [8] [9] [10] [11]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Cash Flow

Source: Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows [12] [13] [14]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Long-Term Record

Fiscal year	Total revenue	Net income attributable to owners	Diluted EPS	Operating cash flow	Shareholders' equity
FY2016	—	—	—	—	1,849,299
FY2017	—	—	—	—	2,201,718
FY2018	—	—	—	—	2,600,231
FY2019	—	—	—	—	3,042,855
FY2020	—	—	—	—	3,415,710
FY2021	—	—	—	—	3,922,653
FY2022	20,988,297	580,496	47	126,871	4,416,863
FY2023	22,086,390	650,766	53	(74,070)	5,038,136
FY2024	25,148,938	739,805	60	273,304	5,661,702
FY2025	27,177,759	813,992	66	(70,178)	6,314,804

Source: consolidated statements across filings; older years from the standardized feed [12] [1] [8] [13]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Analyst Consensus

Street ratings: 2 strong buy, 1 buy. Consensus: Strong Buy.

Estimate source: S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ) consensus, as of 2026-07-27. Estimate figures are S&P Capital IQ consensus (vendor data — no filing page links). EPS and net income use the normalized (adjusted) consensus where the street reports it.

Traceability

243 of 251 figures on this page (97%) link to the filing page where they are printed — click a linked figure to open the source PDF at that page with the row highlighted. Unlinked figures come from standardized data feeds or pre-filing years.

• All figures are consolidated and stated in millions of Rupiah, exactly as printed in the filings' financial statements ("Expressed in millions of Rupiah").

• The provider numeric feed for this run contained ONLY a balance sheet (data/financials/balance_sheet.json); income statement, cash flow, and segment revenue are 100% sourced from the audited filings. The feed's balance-sheet figures reconcile exactly to the filings for every overlapping year (FY2020–FY2025), so no discrepancies are logged.

• FY2022–FY2025 are all filing-cited. Each year is cited to its own annual report where available (FY2025→FY2025 AR, FY2024→FY2024 AR, FY2023→FY2023 AR); FY2022 is the comparative column of the FY2023 annual report (no FY2022 annual report is in the corpus).

• FY2016–FY2021 shareholders' equity in the Long-Term Record is from the standardized data feed (stockanalysis.com, reconciled to filed statements) and is shown without page links; no pre-FY2022 income statement or cash-flow data was available in the corpus or feed.

• Operating-expense line: FY2024/FY2025 filings label it "Operating expenses"; the FY2023 filing labels the identical line "Selling, general and administrative expenses" (the quote text reflects each filing's own wording).

• Segment gross profit (Gross Profit by Segment) is shown before the small consolidation elimination; the sum of the two segments equals the note's pre-elimination total, which differs from the income-statement consolidated gross profit by the elimination (e.g. FY2025: segments 2,226,728 vs consolidated 2,232,544, a +5,816 elimination).

• Short-term borrowings and long-term bank loans were nil in FY2022 (printed as "-"); those two cells carry the value 0 without a page link (a dash has no highlightable figure).

• Quarterly single-quarter figures are derived from cumulative year-to-date interim statements (MTDL interims print only cumulative income and cash-flow columns, not stand-alone quarters); every derived value reconciles exactly to the difference of two printed year-to-date figures, and each derived cell is marked "derived":"ytd_diff" and anchored to the printed cumulative row. Q1 FY25 and Q1 FY26 are printed three-month figures. Derived Q4 FY25 revenue (8,371,986m) and Q1 FY26 revenue (6,711,485m) independently match the amounts reported in the Investing.com earnings calendar (~Rp8.37T and ~Rp6.71T). No quarterly cash-flow feed was available to cross-check the derived operating quarters.

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PT Metrodata Electronics Tbk's management explains the business in its own materials. The slides below do the most of that work, pulled from the documents preserved in Sources. Each source link opens the complete presentation at that slide in a new tab.

Public Expose 2023 (Paparan Publik) — 2023

Management's fullest single explanation of the two-segment business, its strategy and its numbers — fastest way to understand Metrodata. · Open the full document →

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PT Metrodata Electronics Tbk's annual reports contain management's most considered account of the business. These are the sections, passages and visual pages worth opening in the originals preserved in Sources.

PT Metrodata Electronics Tbk — 2025 Annual & Sustainability Report — FY2025

The latest annual report: management's fullest account of a distributor-plus-solutions ICT group navigating weak Indonesian demand while pivoting to AI. · Open the full document →

Directors' Report — p. 18 · Read the full section →

Management's own read on the year — the AI-pioneer strategic pivot and the headline 2025 result set the frame for everything below.

2025 result: revenue Rp27.2tn (+8.1%), net profit to owners Rp814bn (+10.0%), 1.1x liabilities-to-equity.

For the 2025 financial year, the Company recorded revenue of Rp27.2 trillion, representing an 8.1% increase compared to 2024. Net profit attributable to owners of the parent entity grew by 10.0% to Rp814 billion, which translates to greater value delivered to our shareholders. The Company’s financial position remained robust, as reflected by total equity of Rp6.3 trillion and a liabilities-to-equity ratio of 1.1x, providing a solid foundation to support sustainable growth in the future.

p. 21 · Read in context →

Business Activities and Operational Areas — p. 32 · Read the full section →

The clearest statement of what the company actually is — two businesses, Eight Pillars of solutions, and 100+ distribution principals.

The two engines: Digital Solutions & Consulting (Eight Pillars) and a 100+ principal Digital Distribution network.

Currently the Company operates two main businesses, namely Digital Solutions & Consulting and Digital Distribution.

Through its Digital Solutions & Consulting business, Metrodata delivers end-to-end digital transformation services across its Eight Pillars of Digital Solutions: Cloud, Data & AI, Cybersecurity, Business Application, Digital Business Platform, Hybrid AI Infrastructure, Consulting & Advisory Services, and Managed Services. […] Metrodata’s Digital Distribution business has been solidifying its reputation as the most comprehensive ICT distributor in Indonesia. It forges collaboration with over 100 global principals. Throughout its network, the Company serves thousands of partners across hundreds of cities nationwide.

p. 33 · Read in context →

Analysis of Consolidated Statements of Profit or Loss — p. 63 · Read the full section →

Where management explains what actually moved the numbers — smartphones carried a soft consumer-hardware year.

Operational Review — p. 71 · Read the full section →

Segment-by-segment detail — the high-margin solutions unit and the volume-driven distribution unit each get their own diagnosis.

Solutions & Consulting: reactivating dormant accounts and leaning on hyperscaler partnerships for cloud growth.

The Company established dedicated teams tasked with re-mapping thousands of customer accounts considered dormant. Through these efforts, relationships with accounts that had been inactive for the past two to three years were successfully reactivated. […] To address this need, the Company leveraged its strong position as a primary partner of the three largest hyperscalers globally.

p. 72 · Read in context →

Distribution: telecom/smartphones offset a pressured consumer PC segment as the year's growth engine.

The Consumer segment faced the most monumental pressure arising from weakened demand for notebooks and PCs since the beginning of the year. […] In contrast to the weakening demand trend, the Telecommunications segment emerged as a key growth driver for the Digital Distribution Business Unit in 2025. Smartphone sales volume rose steeply, dominated by devices in the low to lower-mid price tiers, even as they came with strong specifications that gave them a competitive edge.

p. 76 · Read in context →

Risk Management — p. 114 · Read the full section →

The two risks specific to this business that could genuinely bite: scarce ICT talent and imported-hardware FX exposure.

Talent risk: growth hinges on retaining scarce ICT experts who must keep pace with fast-moving technology.

In realizing the ICT and digital business development plan, the Company relies on competent, skilled, and expert talents for its business growth. Should the Company fail to retain its executives and experts, a high turnover of employees may occur as a result. Subsequently, should the Company fail to recruit new employees as the replacements, the Company’s performance may be affected, and its revenues may be potentially reduced. […] In addition, the inability of the Company’s employees to keep abreast of the latest market developments in the ICT field may result in the Company marketing products and services that are no longer relevant or attractive to the consumers.

p. 114 · Read in context →

FX risk: much of the product slate is foreign-branded, so a stronger dollar can price demand out of the market.

Certain ICT products offered by the Company are sourced from principals in foreign countries and thus their prices are linked to certain exchange rates. Although some of the principals have set up representative offices in Indonesia and therefore are selling their products in Rupiah, changes in prices that may result from the strengthening of certain foreign currencies may result in a decline in the demand for these products.

p. 115 · Read in context →

Note 2r — Revenue and Expense Recognition — p. 210 · Read the full section →

The accounting policy that defines the model: when Metrodata books gross (principal) versus net (agent) revenue.

Principal vs. agent: third-party/cloud licenses booked net as agent; otherwise revenue is gross as principal.

In arrangements with customers where software licenses are delivered entirely by third party, or where the updates and cloud access are critical and there are no material onpremise components in satisfying its performance obligation, the Group will recognise revenue on a net basis as the Group is acting as an agent in the transaction. In all other cases, the Group is deemed to be acting as principal and revenue is recognised on a gross basis.

p. 210 · Read in context →

Note 25 — Segment Information — p. 243 · Read the full section →

The whole business model in one table: high-volume/thin-margin Distribution against smaller/richer-margin Solutions.

More annual reports

PT Metrodata Electronics Tbk — 2024 Annual & Sustainability Report — FY2024 · 263 pages · Prior-year edition: the +13.9% revenue and +15.9% operating-income growth that 2025's softer print is measured against. · Open →

PT Metrodata Electronics Tbk — 2023 Annual & Sustainability Report — FY2023 · 255 pages · Two years back, pre-AI-pioneer framing — useful baseline for the same two-segment structure and Eight Pillars. · Open →

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Competitors describe PT Metrodata Electronics Tbk's market in their own filings and calls. These verified passages and visual pages show where their strategies meet, using source documents preserved in Sources.

PT Astra Graphia Tbk (ASGR)

The closest listed Indonesian analogue to Metrodata's technology business. Through its 99.99%-owned subsidiary PT Astra Graphia Information Technology (AGIT), Astragraphia resells hardware and software and delivers IT services — managed services, cloud, cybersecurity and infrastructure — the same product-distribution-plus-solutions model that defines Metrodata's two segments (Distribution and Solution & Consultation). Astragraphia's other leg is Fujifilm document and printing solutions, which does not overlap; the exhibits below are drawn only from its IT-solutions business.

How Astragraphia describes its competing IT arm, AGIT: hardware and software sales plus implementation, managed, operations and infrastructure services. This is the same scope as Metrodata's Distribution and Solution & Consultation segments, placing the two in direct overlap in Indonesian enterprise IT. (OCR renders "offers" as "ofers".)

The Information Technology Solutions Portfolio, through its subsidiary PT Astra Graphia Information Technology (AGIT), ofers IT-based business solutions that include hardware sales, software, and implementation services (IT services). Specifically, AGIT's IT Services include Business Application Services, IT Managed Services, IT Operation Services, and Infrastructure Services (EFH). In developing its services, AGIT collaborates with world-class strategic partners.

p. 94 · Read in context →

Astragraphia sizes its competing IT arm: AGIT booked FY2025 net revenue of Rp1,653 billion with 39% profit growth, and is pushing into cybersecurity and cloud. On this disclosure the overlap with Metrodata is real but far smaller in scale — AGIT's revenue is under a tenth of Metrodata's roughly Rp27 trillion FY2025 consolidated revenue.

To improve its position in the IT services market, AGIT also continues to develop new services in cybersecurity and cloud computing. In 2025, AGIT reported a net revenue of Rp1,653 billion and a net profit of Rp66 billion, representing a 39% growth compared to 2024.

p. 95 · Read in context →

Astragraphia's read on the shared market, citing IDC: Indonesian corporate IT spending growing about 13% in 2026, led by cloud, cybersecurity and managed services — the same demand pool Metrodata's Solution & Consultation segment targets.

The information technology sector in Indonesia is projected to see a 13% increase in total corporate spending by 2026, according to International Data Corporation (IDC). This rise is driven by significant investments in IT infrastructure, hardware, software, and services, as both companies and the government accelerate their digital transformation initiatives. […] The rapid digital transformation across various industries creates a substantial business opportunity, especially in managed IT services. Growth is expected to be primarily fueled by cloud computing, cybersecurity, and advanced IT solutions.

p. 96 · Read in context →

More peer documents

Astragraphia FY2024 Annual Report — prior-year IDC market read (p.45) — FY2024 AR · 308 pages · One-year-earlier IDC citation projecting Indonesian enterprise IT spending up 12% in 2025; pairing it with the FY2025 report shows the market-growth assumption Astragraphia and Metrodata both plan against. · Open →

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Source: S&P Capital IQ consensus via Xpressfeed · Generated 2026-07-27.

Coverage is one-analyst-deep with no revenue, momentum, or beat history

Every estimate here comes from a single analyst, and the feed carries no revenue, EBITDA, margin, or cash-flow line. The momentum, quarterly, and beat/miss records are all empty, so revision direction and guidance behavior cannot be assessed.

Forward estimates

Currency: IDR · Scale: money in absolute · YoY uses the prior fiscal year from the feed; analyst count and range use the first displayed period.

Metric	FY2025A	FY2026E	YoY	Analysts	Low / high
EPS (normalized)	IDR 64.70	IDR 72.30	—	1	IDR 64.70 / IDR 64.70

Recommendation skew is fully positive on a lone Rp800 target

The rating mix carries more names than the numeric estimates, but the price target rests on a single submission, so there is no spread to read.

Currency: IDR · Scale: money in absolute · Analyst counts shown explicitly.

Street view	Reading	Analysts
Recommendation mix	Buy 2, Outperform 1, Hold 0, Underperform 0, Sell 0	3
Consensus score	1.33	3
Target price	mean IDR 800.0; median IDR 800.0; high IDR 800.0; low IDR 800.0	1

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Metrodata Electronics is Indonesia's largest listed technology distributor and IT-solutions group: roughly Rp 27 trillion of revenue, earnings that have risen every year since 2019, controlled by the Ciputra family, and financed almost entirely by working capital rather than debt. Yet the shares trade at about book value and under eight times earnings, some 40% below their early-2022 peak, even as profit has grown ~60% over the same window. This report exists to work out which of those two facts is the mistake.

What the company is

Metrodata runs two businesses under one listed holding company [1]. ICT Distribution — moving hardware, software, storage and peripherals from global principals to a national dealer network — is the scale engine. Solution & Consultation — cloud, cybersecurity, data and AI, and SAP-based business transformation delivered by subsidiaries such as Mitra Integrasi Informatika — is the smaller, higher-margin engine.

The economics of the two are very different, and the group's headline margins are an average of them. In FY2025, Distribution booked Rp 20.7 trillion of external sales but only Rp 1.28 trillion of gross profit — a 6% gross margin — while Solution & Consultation turned Rp 6.5 trillion of sales into Rp 0.95 trillion of gross profit, a ~15% margin [2]. So a segment that is under a quarter of revenue produces well over a third of gross profit and pre-tax profit. This mix — a thin, high-volume distribution book carrying a richer solutions layer — is the shape of the whole business.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Note 25 Segment Information — external sales, gross profit and profit before tax by segment [3].

A record of steady growth

For a company the market treats as a value trap, the operating record is unusually consistent. Revenue has compounded from Rp 18.5 trillion in 2021 to Rp 27.2 trillion in 2025, and profit attributable to owners has risen every year — Rp 508.9 billion, Rp 580.5 billion, Rp 650.8 billion, Rp 739.8 billion, Rp 814.0 billion — carrying basic EPS from Rp 41.45 to Rp 66.30 [4]. Gross margin has held in a narrow 8.1–8.7% band and operating margin near 5.3% throughout, so the growth is volume plus a slowly richer mix, not a one-off margin event [5].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, 2025 Performance Highlights, five-year financial table [6].

The market moved the other way

The share price has done the opposite of the earnings. The stock reached an all-time high of Rp 845 on 5 January 2022; it closed at Rp 510 on 27 July 2026 — roughly 40% lower, over a period in which EPS rose about 60%. The compression is entirely in the multiple: at the peak the shares changed hands near 20 times trailing earnings, and today they sit at about 7.7 times FY2025 EPS of Rp 66.30. On the roughly 12.28 billion shares outstanding [7], Rp 510 implies a market capitalisation near Rp 6.3 trillion — just under the Rp 6.31 trillion of book equity the company reported at year-end [8].

Valuation derived from Rp 510 close (Yahoo Finance feed, 27 July 2026) against FY2025 EPS, book equity and the FY2024 dividend of Rp 24.00 per share; peak of Rp 845 on 5 January 2022 per Simply Wall St price history.

Two things anchor the downside. First, the balance sheet is conservative: against Rp 1.30 trillion of cash the group carried only Rp 1.01 trillion of short-term and Rp 0.12 trillion of long-term bank debt at end-2025, a small net-cash position, and it held Rp 5.13 trillion of undrawn committed facilities [9]. Second, the company pays out roughly 40% of earnings — Rp 24.00 per share distributed in 2025, a 39.8% payout — for a trailing yield near 4.7% at the current price, with the payout ratio having climbed from the low-20s a few years earlier [10]. A business that grows, self-funds, and returns cash is not the usual profile of a stock priced at liquidation value.

The counter-fact a bull has to hold is the one honest caveat to that net-cash comfort: short-term bank borrowings have tripled since 2023 (Rp 296 billion → Rp 770 billion → Rp 1,007 billion) to finance a growing working-capital book, so the net-cash cushion is thin and directionally shrinking, not a fortress [11].

Who owns it, and a wrinkle in the earnings

Metrodata is family-controlled. PT Ciputra Corpora — the Ciputra family holding company — owns 36.2% of the shares; President Commissioner Candra Ciputra holds a further 0.25% directly [12]. Two features of the register are worth a value investor's attention: a Singapore value manager, Pangolin Investment Management, sits on the top table with 6.4%, and long-standing holder Sukarto Bujung another 5.0%, with the public float at 35.4% [13]. The controlling family is aligned through a large economic stake; independent value capital already holds a seat.

There is one structural wrinkle a newcomer must not miss when reading the headline numbers. The distribution engine — most of group revenue — runs through PT Synnex Metrodata Indonesia, which Metrodata owns 50% [14]. Because that subsidiary is consolidated in full, the group reports 100% of its revenue but only half of its profit belongs to Metrodata shareholders. It shows up as a large minority leak: of Rp 1,143.9 billion of total comprehensive income in FY2025, only Rp 815.3 billion — about 71% — was attributable to owners of the parent [15]. The per-share figures above already net this out, but the headline "Rp 27 trillion revenue" overstates the shareholders' economic interest, and that gap is part of why the multiple looks the way it does. It deserves a chapter of its own.

What the Street expects next

Coverage is thin — one to three analysts — so forward estimates carry more uncertainty than the operating record. The available consensus looks for revenue near Rp 29.7 trillion in FY2026 and Rp 32.7 trillion in FY2027, with EPS around Rp 72.6 then Rp 79.9 — roughly 10% annual growth, an extrapolation of the recent trend rather than an inflection. Published 12-month price targets span Rp 800 to ~Rp 1,020, all above the current Rp 510, though on so few analysts the signal is weak. Momentum has, if anything, reaccelerated: Q1 FY2026 revenue grew 21.4% year on year.

Forward estimates and price targets: Simply Wall St and Investing.com consensus as of July 2026 (thin, 1–3 analyst coverage); Q1 FY2026 growth per company press release.

The question this report will answer

Metrodata presents a genuine tension. The evidence for a mispricing is real: a business that has grown revenue and owner's earnings every year, run conservatively, controlled by an aligned family, already held by a value fund, priced at about book value, under eight times earnings, and yielding near 5%. The evidence for a deserved discount is also real: it is fundamentally a ~3%-net-margin distributor whose largest engine is only half-owned, in a cyclical, capital-light business where scale does not automatically confer pricing power.

So the question the rest of this report exists to answer is this: is Metrodata's compressed valuation — roughly book value and under eight times earnings — the market correctly pricing a thin-margin distributor whose scale engine leaks half its profit to minorities, or is it mispricing a durable, conservatively financed proxy for Indonesian enterprise digitalisation that happens to grow? What would settle it is not the headline multiple but the quality of the earnings underneath it: how much of the growth belongs to shareholders, how durable the higher-margin solutions layer is, and whether the family runs the business for owners or for control.

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Look-Through Earnings

Metrodata's distribution engine — 76% of group revenue — runs almost entirely through PT Synnex Metrodata Indonesia (SMI), a subsidiary the company owns 50% of but consolidates in full. On a look-through basis that engine delivers only about 40% of the profit that belongs to Metrodata shareholders; the higher-margin, wholly-owned Solutions business supplies the majority. The minority's half is real cash: Rp196 billion left the group in FY2025 dividends to the partner alone [1].

The engine sits in a half-owned subsidiary

Metrodata reports through two segments — Distribution and Solution and Consultation — but the Distribution business does not sit inside the parent [2]. It runs through a set of subsidiaries led by PT Synnex Metrodata Indonesia, the ICT-distribution vehicle Metrodata formed with Taiwan's Synnex Technology International (now part of TD SYNNEX) [3]. Metrodata holds 50% of SMI's shares and 50% of its voting rights [4].

That a 50/50 arrangement is consolidated in full — rather than equity-accounted as a joint venture — rests on a judgment the company flags as critical. Metrodata controls SMI because the current composition of SMI's board of directors, which holds decision-making authority over its planning, operating and financial policies, gives the parent the power to govern those policies and exposure to variable returns [5]. The consequence is arithmetic: SMI's entire Rp21.0 trillion of revenue and Rp7.1 trillion of assets are consolidated at 100%, while half of its equity and half of its profit belong to the partner [6].

The non-controlling interest on the balance sheet is almost entirely SMI: of Rp1,602.5 billion of NCI equity at end-2025, Rp1,595.1 billion — 99.5% — is the distribution partner's half of SMI, with two small subsidiaries making up the rest [7]. That NCI is a quarter of the group's Rp6,314.8 billion of total equity [8]. A second distribution subsidiary, PT Synnex Metrodata Technology and Services, is also 50%-owned, so the half-ownership pattern is specific to the distribution side of the house [9].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Note 20 Non-Controlling Interests [10].

Revenue optics versus owner earnings

On the segment page the two businesses look lopsided. Distribution sold Rp20.7 trillion to external customers in FY2025 against Solution and Consultation's Rp6.5 trillion — roughly 76% versus 24% of revenue [11]. But the two segments earn at very different rates. Distribution's gross margin is about 6% (Rp1,276.8 billion of gross profit on Rp21.4 trillion of segment revenue); Solutions runs near 15% (Rp950.0 billion on Rp6.5 trillion) [12]. Pre-tax, the gap narrows: Distribution contributed Rp843.0 billion of segment profit before tax and Solutions Rp591.5 billion — 59% versus 41% [13].

The ownership overlay changes the picture again. Because the Distribution engine is half-owned and Solutions is wholly owned, the share of profit that actually reaches Metrodata shareholders tilts toward the smaller, higher-margin business.

Sources: revenue split per FY2025 segment note [14]; owner-earnings split derived from Note 20 and the consolidated profit split [15].

The look-through works from the group's own numbers. SMI earned Rp656.3 billion of net profit in FY2025 [16]. Of the group's Rp1,143.1 billion of profit for the year, Rp814.0 billion is attributable to owners of the parent and Rp329.1 billion to non-controlling interests [17]. That NCI line is, within a rounding error, the partner's half of SMI — meaning Metrodata's own half is roughly the same, about Rp328 billion. The rest of owner profit, roughly Rp486 billion, comes from the wholly-owned Solutions business, its associates and the parent [18].

Source: derived from FY2025 consolidated profit split and Note 20 [19]; [20].

Sources: FY2025 segment note [21]; consolidated profit split [22]; Note 20 [23].

So the headline that Distribution is three-quarters of the business is true of revenue and roughly true of pre-tax segment profit, but on the profit that reaches shareholders the weight flips: the wholly-owned Solutions layer and the parent are the majority, and the commodity distribution engine — for all its scale — is the minority contributor to owner earnings.

The minority's half is cash, not just an accounting line

The partner's share is not a paper adjustment that nets out below the line; it is settled in cash. SMI paid Rp196.2 billion of dividends to its non-controlling interest in FY2025 and Rp202.3 billion in FY2024 [24], following Rp143.3 billion in 2023 and Rp252.5 billion in 2022 [25]. Across those four years roughly Rp794 billion of cash left the group for the distribution partner. For scale, the parent paid its own shareholders Rp294.6 billion in FY2025, so the partner's draw runs at about two-thirds of Metrodata's own dividend [26].

Sources: FY2025 Note 20 for 2024–2025 [27]; FY2023 Note 20 for 2022–2023 [28].

SMI's distribution profit has ground higher — from Rp572.2 billion in 2022 to Rp656.3 billion in 2025 — but the retained share still accrues half to the partner, whose balance-sheet stake rose from Rp1,193.2 billion to Rp1,595.1 billion over the same window [29]. One footnote in the same disclosure is worth carrying into a later cash chapter: SMI generated only Rp58.6 billion of operating cash flow in FY2025 against its Rp656.3 billion of profit, the mark of a working-capital-heavy distributor [30].

What the split means for the thesis

The look-through cuts both ways against a simple reading of the multiple. The bear framing — a thin-margin distributor of which shareholders own only half — is accurate about revenue and the balance sheet, but overstated about earnings: the profit shareholders actually keep is majority the higher-margin, wholly-owned Solutions business, not the 6%-gross-margin distribution flow. The compounding a bull would pay up for lives in the part of the group Metrodata owns outright.

Two facts sit against reading this as hidden value. First, the reported multiple is not fooled by the structure. Per-share earnings of Rp66.30 and the roughly 7.7-times multiple are struck on the Rp814.0 billion that belongs to owners, not on consolidated profit, so the minority's half is already netted out of the valuation [31]. The open question is whether a stream that is roughly 60% higher-margin solutions earnings should carry the distributor's multiple the shares trade on today. Second, the full consolidation of a 50/50 venture depends on a board-composition judgment rather than a majority stake [32]; a change in the TD SYNNEX relationship is a governance dependency that a look-through investor should price, even if the arrangement has been stable for years and both sides keep reinvesting in it [33].

The read that would change is a shift in either lever: SMI's ownership moving toward a majority stake — which would pull the distribution engine's earnings fully to owners — or the Solutions share of look-through profit continuing to climb, which would keep re-weighting shareholder earnings toward the business that compounds fastest.

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Margin Engine

Metrodata's Solution and Consultation segment is the group's margin engine: roughly a quarter of revenue but about 43% of segment gross profit, at a gross margin near 15% that has held within a narrow band for four years while distribution margins drifted lower [1]. A Rp6.5 trillion order backlog running to 2032, plus recurring cloud, maintenance and managed-services income, gives it a durable base [2]. Its revenue, though, has been broadly flat since 2023.

The look-through economics (Look-Through Earnings) established that this wholly-owned Solutions business supplies the majority of the profit belonging to shareholders. Whether it deserves more than a distributor's multiple depends on what that segment actually is — a durable, moated services franchise, or a value-added reselling layer whose margin is capped and whose growth has stalled. This chapter tests that.

A quarter of the revenue, over 40% of the gross profit

The segment reporting splits Metrodata into two divisions: Distribution (sale of hardware and software) and Solution and Consultation, which the company defines as maintenance to keep systems running, sale of system-level software and serverware, and professional services for consultation, implementation and training [3]. The two earn their living very differently.

In FY2025, Solutions turned Rp6,465.0 billion of revenue into Rp950.0 billion of gross profit — a 14.7% gross margin — while Distribution needed Rp21,421.8 billion of revenue to produce Rp1,276.8 billion, a 6.0% margin [1]. So on 23% of segment revenue, Solutions delivered 43% of the combined Rp2,226.7 billion of segment gross profit. That ratio is not a one-year artefact.

Source: segment notes, FY2023–FY2025 Annual Reports [1] [10] [11].

Across four years the Solutions gross margin sat in a 13.8%–15.0% band, while Distribution drifted from 6.4% toward 6.0% [1] [3] [11]. The stability matters more than the level: a business whose margin holds through a national election year, a post-pandemic PC correction and a weakening rupiah is priced by different mechanics than a hardware reseller passing through principals' price lists [4].

Operating margin tells a more sober version of the same story. Solutions carries heavy people costs — Rp429.4 billion of operating expenses in FY2025, more than Distribution's Rp374.1 billion despite a third of the revenue — so its operating margin was 8.1%, against roughly 4.2% for Distribution [1]. Higher margin, then, but not a light-touch business.

Source: Solution and Consultation segment, FY2023–FY2025 Annual Reports (revenue on total net-revenue basis) [1] [3] [11].

How much of it recurs

A margin that holds is worth more if the revenue behind it repeats. Three disclosures suggest a meaningful part of the Solutions layer does.

The first is the split between revenue booked at a point in time and revenue booked over time. Of Rp27,177.8 billion of FY2025 net revenue, Rp22,957.1 billion was recognised at a point in time — the hardware-and-software pass-through — and Rp4,220.6 billion, about 15.5%, was recognised over time, the ratable services base [2]. Management attributes the Solutions unit's resilience to exactly this: steady recurring income from maintenance, cloud and managed services, backed by the loyalty of strategic clients in financial services, telecommunications, and oil and gas [5].

The second is the order book. At end-2025 the group carried Rp6,466.5 billion of unsatisfied performance obligations — contracted revenue not yet delivered — expected to complete anywhere from 2026 out to 2032, up from Rp6,166.6 billion a year earlier [2]. That backlog is roughly one full year of Solutions revenue already under contract, and its long tail is the signature of multi-year maintenance and managed-services agreements rather than one-off box sales.

The third is deferred revenue. Contract liabilities — cash collected ahead of delivery — rose to Rp1,568.9 billion from Rp1,446.4 billion, and Rp1,140.8 billion of prior-year contract liabilities converted into FY2025 revenue [2]. A growing deferred-revenue balance that reliably unwinds into sales is the working-capital fingerprint of a subscription-and-maintenance book.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Note 21 Net Revenue [2].

One more disclosure cuts the concentration worry a value investor would raise: no single customer accounted for more than 10% of net revenue in FY2025 [2]. The recurring base is spread across many enterprise accounts, not hostage to one.

What holds the clients — and what does not

The durable margin has to come from somewhere the customer cannot easily replicate. Metrodata's evidence points to accreditation and embedded systems rather than proprietary technology.

On the enterprise-application side, Metrodata's consulting unit holds SAP Global's Partner Center of Expertise, Application Management Services and Partner Quality Program certifications for products such as SAP All-in-One and SAP Business One [6]. An ERP system, once implemented, sits at the centre of a client's finance and supply-chain operations; the accredited implementer that installed it holds a switching cost measured in operational risk, not just fees. On the infrastructure side, the company positions itself as a primary partner of the three largest global hyperscalers, letting it broker multi-cloud architectures as clients migrate core systems off-premise [4]. Underneath both sits the talent base: Metrodata Academy ran more than 270 training classes for roughly 1,700 participants in 2025, feeding the vendor certifications the model runs on [7].

The eight-pillar portfolio shows where the growth is concentrated. Cloud is the largest revenue contributor, followed by Business Applications; Cybersecurity, Data and AI, and Hybrid IT Infrastructure are the faster-growing but still-small pillars [8]. That mix is squarely aligned with Indonesian enterprise digitalisation, and it is the part of the group a bull is really buying.

The counter-case sits in the same disclosures. The advantage is largely borrowed: cloud revenue is resold hyperscaler capacity and the ERP franchise is built on another vendor's platform, so the margin is capped by what the principals allow. Management says as much — as ERP shifts from on-premise to cloud, "certain services were increasingly handled directly by principals," reshaping the unit's revenue structure and forcing Metrodata to lean on new demand to offset the leakage [4]. The company's own risk register flags that weaker economic conditions delay ICT orders in the Solutions and Consulting business specifically [9].

And the margin is not capital-light. Solutions tied up Rp6,003.5 billion of segment assets at end-2025 — 46% of the group's segment assets on 23% of revenue — against Distribution's Rp7,146.1 billion, because long-dated contracts leave receivables and contract assets on the books [1]. Asset turnover of roughly one time revenue is closer to a project-services house than a software licensor.

A durable margin, a stalled top line

The clearest limit on the bull case is growth. After stepping up 23% in 2023, Solutions external revenue was essentially flat for two years — Rp6,208.5 billion in 2023, Rp6,187.8 billion in 2024, Rp6,464.3 billion in 2025 [1] [3] [10].

Source: segment notes, FY2023–FY2025 Annual Reports [1] [10] [11].

That 2025 gain leaned partly on a defensive move: the unit built teams to re-map thousands of dormant accounts and reactivate clients that had not transacted in two to three years, and management credits that reactivation for holding the year's revenue together [4]. Mining an existing base is a sign of a sticky book; it is not organic expansion.

The evidence supports a measured read. The Solutions margin is genuinely durable — a four-year band near 15%, an order book contracted to 2032, a diversified recurring base, and real accreditation-and-switching-cost advantages in ERP and cloud. That is more than a commodity distributor owns, and it is why the segment carries the majority of look-through owner earnings on a minority of revenue. But it is a value-added services layer built on principals' platforms, capital-heavy, margin-capped, and cyclically exposed, and it has not grown for two years. The read that would change is the top line: a return to double-digit Solutions revenue growth — led by the Cybersecurity, Data and AI, and Managed-Services pillars — would argue the market is under-pricing a compounder; another two flat years would say the distributor's multiple is close to right.